Sense-Certainty: Live in the Moment

Sense-Certainty

Introduction

This is the first post on the phenomenology proper. It is also the most important. If you can understand what is going on here, and perhaps elaborate upon it on your own, that is, you can add further points that I may have missed in this post, then you are in a good position to understand what is going on in the subsequent sections. The reason for this is that the subsequent sections, after sense-certainty and perception, take the movement that consciousness undergoes in these first to sections, and utilize it as their object. More specifically, the next section is the Understanding. Consciousness, which will assume the shape that Hegel calls the Understanding, takes as its object what Hegel calls "Force". Force is merely an abbreviation and elaboration of what consciousness experiences in these first two sections.

Before getting into the specifics, it is useful to have a roadmap, or guideline, in mind of the path which consciousness will trace out. I use the word "path" to indicate a movement not in two dimensions (along a straight or curved line from points A to B), or in three dimensions (along a path that begins at point A and ends at point B), but a path that can be in any dimension, and begins with one permutation of a shape (point A) and ends with another (point B). That being said, sense-certainty has three permutations; in other words, sense-certainty, as a shape, has three sub-shapes that are nested within the larger shape. These sub-shapes it assumes come about as a result of it re-configuring its relation to its object. Thus the path it takes is from one subshape to another.

The three sub-shapes, which will be headed as subsections of sense-certainty, each come about as a result of consciousness thinking through and elaborating upon its previous sub-shape, finding tension and conflict within that construal of its object, and finding a solution, and thereby relieving itself of that tension, in the form of a new sub-shape. Of course, only the first sub-shape is exempt from this rule. Keep in mind, however, that every shape that comes about henceforth comes about through this process. In this way, we are able to see consciousness undergo a transformation, by its own powers, without any interference from us.

This transformation is self-propelling.

 Hegel mentioned in the introduction that we, as readers, will be able to see aspects of consciousness that it will not be able to see about itself. This is so because consciousness does not have the capacity to see those aspects about itself. It has not developed them.

If one map is good to have, then two is better. Another way of looking at this transformation is as follows. Consciousness has before itself an object, which is distinguished from consciousness itself, and it evaluates its object. This is the first sub-shape. It finds tensions and conflicts in that object. That is to say, there is asymmetry between the what it takes its object to be, and what it actually is. In other words, there is a difference between how it imagines its object to be, and how it is really, if we only take notice of how it is in the real world. This asymmetry, between how it imagines its object to be, and how it actually is, is the tension and conflict we have been talking about. There is no way for consciousness to continue to maintain that its object is how it imagines to be, but it will attempt to save its object. 

Consciousness has to use every tool in its arsenal in order to maintain the object as it is. In the second shape, it will use itself, and will attempt to integrate itself into the object in order to save it from falling into the nothingness of abstraction due to its tensions. Remember. If there is contradiction and tension in anything, when it comes to knowledge it is not the true. Each object that consciousness takes to be its standard is, for it, the Absolute. It is the divine for it. There is no other object that lies beyond it. Consciousness, in each stage, has sort of a fanatic attitude towards its object. It itself does not recognize or describe its fanaticism as fanaticism, but this is how it behaves. It must be concerned with preserving its object, and therefore itself as that shape that takes that object as a standard; it is concerned with self-preservation.

Once it integrates itself into its construal of what is now the new and true object, it will find through comparison new tensions and new contradictions between what it takes its object to be, and what it actually is in reality. Again, it will alter its object having taken account of these new tensions and contradictions, and develop yet another object, the third sub-shape. In this shape, it will try to combine the movements of the previous two sub-shapes in a last desperate attempt to save its object. New tensions and contradictions will arise, forcing sense-certainty to finally abandon its construal of the object as it originally took it to be in the first sub-shape. This is where a new object will arise, and therefore a new standard, a new Absolute, will arise for consciousness. It will redefine itself according to this new standard and, therefore, it will become a new shape, perception. 

Keep in mind, however, that this basic pattern will persist in the subsequent shapes. The same kind of thing will occur, but the content will be different. That is, consciousness will not always respond to tension in the same way. The way it responds is dependent on its stage in development, and what it has experienced before with us. If you understand, you will find that your instincts are being altered as well, and unlike the uninitiated reader who begins somewhere else rather than at the beginning, what happens to consciousness will simply make sense. It will make sense, and you will be able to explain why it makes sense. 

Sub-shape 1: "This is Here and Now, With or Without Me"

As we have already shown, our one and only assumption about the relation between knowing and its object can be that knowing is distinct from its object. From this assumption, we are able to extract a capacity that this first shape will be able to utilize, namely the capacity to distinguish and make distinctions. Second, we also see implicitly from the statement, "knowing is distinct from its object", that knowing is knowing and the object is the object. We must assume this in order for the statement to make any sense at all. While this might be redundant, it is nevertheless sufficient to justify the extraction of another capacity, identification. In this very first stage, consciousness, as knowing, is the state of being distinct from its object; its state of being distinct allows to engage in the activity of distinguishing. We distinguish, right here, state of being and activity. A state of being is static, unchanging, inert, passive; an activity is dynamic, a changing, active. At the same time, knowing is identical to itself, as a state of being; this being identical to itself not only enables it to use identification as a capacity, but also allows it to have the attitude of having certainty of itself. Using our language, it can be said that consciousness in this first infant stage, is supremely confident in itself and its knowledge. Hegel calls it certainty. It is certain of its object to which it relates via its senses, hence it is certain of its sense. Thus, it is called "sense-certainty". 

When starting a new enterprise, believe in yourself.

These tools, the capacity to distinguish and identify (for you math geeks, think differentiation and integration in calculus), is present for consciousness right at the start. 

Consciousness, which henceforth will be addressed as its shape, sense-certainty, is certain and confident in itself because it is confident in its object. It identifies with itself, and identifies with its object. We said before that knowing is distinct from its object. Yet at the same time, in order to relate to something that is distinct, one must relate; this is just another way of saying that one must identify oneself with that thing to which one relates. Thus, consciousness relates to the object while remaining distinct from it. The object is the particular thing that appears to sense-certainty via its senses. It sees the particular thing, it hears it, it feels it. Sense-certainty is one with its object. It alters nothing about the object. It is confident that its relation to its object is true knowing. It's object is the Absolute. It is what it is and it is because it is. Nothing more can be said about its object. 

Sense-certainty in this sub-shape takes itself to be pure identity, since its object is a pure identity, and its relation to its object as pure identity. It is simple. The object is right there for consciousness to see, hear, touch, taste, feel; the object is right there, as a real thing, for consciousness to sense.  The sensing is taken to be identical to the sensed. There is no distinction that separates either consciousness from itself, or it from its object. It receives its object in its totality, completely unaltered, and if it were to act upon it the only way it knew how to, by identifying with it, then we can see that the object remains completely unaltered. Its relation to the object, since it lacks any alteration, is immediate. It is unmediated. It is raw. Interpretation is unnecessary. 

The object of sense certainty has two features: it is both immediate and it is particular. It is there to be sensed immediately. It is a sensuous immediacy. This is how sense-certainty considers it to be. Both the object and sense-certainty are a singular simple "This" that is immediate and particular, and it refers to immediate and particular things. The object construed is taken to be the supreme Absolute. It exists regardless of whether or not it is known via sense. In order to be truly certain, it must test its own certainty of sense. By the very act of carrying out this test, it cannot help but differentiate itself from its object. Sense-certainty is, after all, an activity of knowing and the object is the thing that is passively known. Since the object is supreme, sense-certainty takes it to be the essential aspect of its own essence. What makes sense-certainty sense-certainty is not sense-certainty, but its object, which has the status of being Absolute, divine. Already, we see differentiation, and that singular and simple This turns out to be in truth two Thises. Sense-certainty takes itself to be identical to its object, in principle, but in fact, if we are honest with ourselves and resist the temptation of falling into and agreeing with the fanaticism of sense-certainty, we see that there is in fact a difference between sensing and the thing sensed. The singular and simple "This" turns out to be dual natured. There are two Thises, one essential, the other inessential.

Sense-certainty uses the word, "This", to describe both itself and its object, in order to emphasize the particularity and immediacy of the the object and, by extension, itself. If it is to be successful in the test of its certainty, it must be able to be specific. Thus, it must be asked, "What is This?" Sense-certainty considers all to be identical, so it can only respond, "This is This." But "This" can refer to anything. Unless that thing is present for us to sense, "This" is an ambiguous and abstract designator of objects. What is This? It is supposed to refer to a particular thing that exists concretely. Yet, we see that in truth it is only a kind of universal. It turns out to be not immediate, as sense-certainty originally took it to be. The word, This, neither refers to immediate or particular things. Further, when you use the word, This, you distinguish yourself from the thing to which you are referring. So rather than identifying yourself with "This" whatever "This" might be, as sense-certainty in its first sub-shape imagines, in reality you are distinguishing yourself from that thing. Fuck. 

We have a tension. Sense-certainty's object is revealed to be something other than what it originally took it to be. Sense-certainty cannot assign any content to the abstract signifier, This. Originally, the abstract signifier, This, was supposed to be identical to the immediate, simple, particularity it referred to. But the word is neither immediate, nor is it simple, nor is it particular. The word, This, by itself does not give us access to the object which it is supposed to be referring to. It cannot point us to a specific content. The word, This, can potentially refer to any object; it is a universal. Sense-certainty, nevertheless, attempts to deduce the content of This by elaborating on what it means to say when it says "This". Sense-certainty describes what it means to say by telling itself (it's talking to itself, we're just watching) what it is doing with that word, This, when it uses it. In doing this, it will be able to extract a specific content. 

At this point, we should notice that sense-certainty's attitude has changed. It is no longer supremely self-confident. It is no longer certain. It is in doubt. It wants to regain its confidence. It will attempt to accomplish this by finding a content for the word, This, by elaborating upon what it means when it says, This. When sense-certainty says "This", it means, "This which is Now". Now is This Moment. Sense-certainty must respond in this way. The sensuous, immediate, particular object it encounters and senses can only exist in this very moment, Now. It recognizes that it is situated in time. Sense-certainty exists in time and is a part of a temporal sequence. Here, it identifies itself with that sequence. It attempts to regain its original confidence, which was almost a divine and supreme self-confidence, by living in the moment. Indeed, this is what is meant when it is suggested that one "live in the moment". 

Sexy.

The object for sense-certainty is the Now. The Now is a particular content to which "This" refers to. It appears that sense-certainty has regained its self-confidence. We can test that the truth of that notion. Write down the words "Now is Day" on a piece of paper. The truth of a statement is preserved when it is written down; it cannot be lost. Come back later that night. The sky is dark. If you are lucky there are stars that litter the night sky, and the moon might be present. If you look at what you wrote "Now is Day", which at the moment in which it was written was true, has become false. Now is not Day. Now is Night. The true, which is the object of sense-certainty, construed as Now, has become the false, the not-true. It is still "Now", it is always Now, but the content of Now is always different. It can be anything. So, again, the word "Now" falls into the same problem that confronted the word "This". Sense-certainty's attempt to save its object, and regain its certainty, its self-confidence, is undermined. What it took the Now to be, i.e. a particular and immediate content of the word "This" which refers to immediate, particular, and specific being, turns out to be unsuccessful in determining a content, and preserving it as an immediate particular. The Now, being an immediate particular, was supposed to be identical to its content, that which abides in the Now which sense-certainty can sense with its senses. It has turned out that "Now", as a word, is distinct from its content. "Now" is one word, but it can potentially contain an infinite amount, and infinite kinds, of content. What Now, to which "Now" refers actually is like, is distinct from how sense-certainty originally took it to be. So "Now" can refer to anything, just like "This". The word "Now" is a signifier that can refer to any moment whatsoever, which contains different content; thus, "Now" is a universal, like "This". "Now" was supposed to originally refer to a particular, immediacy. It has been shown to be a universal. A new tension has arisen. 

Sense-certainty tries to regain its confidence by trying a different tactic. It will attempt to determine the content of  "This", which is its object, by appealing to its spatiality. Sense-certainty always lives Here, so it now says, "This is Here". What is Here does not have to change with the changing of the Nows. "Here", claims sense-certainty, "is a tree." But it can easily turn around. Its claim that Here is a tree loses its validity. It is no longer true. Now Here is a House. Like the words "This" and "Now", the word "Here" can refer to anything at all. No specific or particular content can be derived from simply uttering the word "Here". "Here" turns out to be another universal. The word "Here", while it is singular and particular, can refer to anything. Its content is not singular or particular. Anything is many things, and many particulars. Further, anything whatsoever is not immediate; a universal is not immediate. We cannot sense universals as universals. Only their particulars. We cannot sense all dogs, only some dogs. What it originally took "Here" to be has turned out to be different from what "Here" really is.

Sense-certainty, in attempting to elaborate what it means to say when it says "This", ended up talking in circles. It said nothing new. It will make a final attempt to save its object, and regain its self-confidence, by stating that "This is This Here Now". But we can simply refer to the previous two paragraphs together to see that, again, sense-certainty says nothing new. Its object, an immediate, particular, object that is present right there for consciousness to sense, referred to as "This Here Now", or "This Now Here", or "Now This Here", etc., has turned out to be universal. The object as sense-certainty imagined it to be is different from what it actually is. Its knowledge is no knowledge at all. Knowledge is supposed to be a kind of imagination of how something is, and the thing actually is exactly how one imagines it to be. 

Even worse for sense-certainty, if we want to be cruel and put salt in the wound of its self-confidence, we can say that the relation between sense-certainty and its object is not immediate. It must use words to describe the object, and the words "This", "Here", and "Now" are distinct from the things to which they refer, This, Here, Now. In elementary logic, this difference is known as the difference between use and mention. The words, mediate the relation between sense-certainty as an activity of knowing, and its object. The relation (identity) between sense-certainty and its object, the sensing and the sensed, is not immediate, but mediated. It is mediated by words. Of course, one can object by saying that sense-certainty has not developed the capacity to use language. It can only differentiate and identify. Nevertheless, it still senses. And one sense, pleasure for example, is distinct in kind from another, pain. We can sense the difference between pleasure and pain, and we do not have say that there is a difference. The difference just is regardless of whether or not we speak it. We, as readers, speak for sense-certainty what it says to itself, what it would say if it could speak to itself. Time and Space, Now and Here, exist whether or not we speak it. That which we sense is Now and Here.

This is not particular, but universal. Now is not particular, but universal. Here is not particular, but universal. This Now Here is not particular, but universal. The words "Now" and "Here" and "This" are not particular, but universal. None of these are immediate, as they were taken to be, but mediated. In sum, the object, taken to be as "This, Here, Now" is not particular or immediate, as it was originally taken to be, but universal and mediated, as it is in actually. There is a tension and asymmetry between what sense-certainty imagines its object to be, and what it actually is like. Therefore sense-certainty does not know its object. Still, sense-certainty is a fanatic. It will make an attempt to preserve its object as particular and immediate by relating to it in a different way. In relating to it in a different way, it is slightly different from the way it related to its object in the first sub-shape. In relating to its object in a different way, sense-certainty, therefore, becomes a new sub-shape.

Sub-shape 2: "This is Here and Now Because of Me; I am in it. It is mine"

The shift into this shape is dependent on one small change that sense-certainty makes. This change allows it to maintain its object as a sensuous, immediate, particular, as well as to maintain its relation to its object as an identity. Sense-certainty can no longer insist that the object, by itself, can remain in actuality what sense-certainty imagined it to be: an immediate, particular entity that is present for sense-certainty to sense. The object, if left to its own devices, turns out to be in truth a universal, and turns out be in truth mediated. We cannot sense universals, and we cannot sense things that are not present right there for us to sense. In other words, the object does not allow itself to remain what it is as it is for sense-certainty. The integrity of the object has been mangled (severely mutilated and disfigured) by the object itself. The essence of the object, the particular and immediacy, does not reside in the object. Only one aspect of sense-certainty has survived this mutilation: sense-certainty itself. Sense-certainty, as an activity of knowing, is itself still a simple immediacy. Sense-certainty itself is still an immediate particular. Therefore, the essence of the object, as an immediate particular This Here Now, resides in the activity of knowing itself, sense-certainty. It is because of sense-certainty itself that the object is a particular, immediate, sensuous being. The object is no longer left to its own devices. Like an unruly child, its unsupervised play is now put under supervision. 

This happened Here, Now.

Thus, sense-certainty is able to maintain the object as an immediate particular sensuous being that is present for sense-certainty to sense. It does this by claiming that it, as an activity of knowing, is responsible for the character of the object. Thus, sense-certainty proclaims that "This is Now because I am in it, it is my Now."Similarly, it proclaims that "This is Here because I am Here to see it, hear it, feel it, taste it, touch it (I sense it)." The activity of sensing is an immediate simplicity. It is particular, and I can sense my sensing. 

Its self-certainty, its self-confident attitude, cannot now be undermined by asking it to specify the content of This, Here, and Now. We cannot ask it, "What is This?", "What is Now?", "What is Here?", since doing so only undermines the object for sense-certainty as "This". Even if we try it doesn't matter, since the immediate particularity of the sensuous object is dependent on the activity of knowing, sense-certainty itself. Even if we try to show that every Now and every Here vanishes, as we did before, sense-certainty can defend its object, and itself. Suppose we were to say, as before, that every Now vanishes (Day becomes Night), sense-certainty would retort that it doesn't matter. It would say, "Now is Day because I am in it. Now is Night (not-Day) because  I am in it." Whatever content that happens to be present in the Now, it is always sense-certainty itself that is in it. Further, sense-certainty is able to point out a specific, particular, immediate content that is present in the Now, namely itself, which is a particular, sensuous object, to itself. 

And in a similar fashion, sense-certainty can respond to our question, "What is Here?", by saying, for example, "Here is a tree. And Here is a tree because I sense it. I see it. I feel it." And if we were to say, in another moment, "Now Here is a house", it would respond, "So what? Here is a house. But it is a house because I sense it. I see it. I feel it." If we were to say, in yet another moment, "Now Here is an apple." "Here is an apple because I sense it. I see it, feel it, taste it." One can figure out on his own how sense-certainty would respond if one said, "Here is a sound." Just like the character of the Now has become indifferent to its objective content, the character of the Here is indifferent to its objective content. All that matters is that sense-certainty is in it. Of course, we use the word "would" when we say that sense-certainty "would" say, because sense-certainty cannot speak. We are just describing its feelings in words. The object is what it is because of sense-certainty itself. And sense-certainty is what it is because of the object. Here, we find that sense-certainty has been able to even preserve its identity with its object in making this move. Since, This is Now and Here, and it has shown that Now and Here are immediate particulars because sense-certainty itself is present in it, and because they are immediate particulars on account of that sense-certainty which is present in it.

The immediate particularity of the sensuous object for sense-certainty is dependent upon the immediate particularity of sense-certainty itself, as an activity of knowing. Sense-certainty has been able to regain its certainty, its self-confidence, as well its object, as it originally construed it. This certainty, again, must be tested. We now ask sense-certainty, "when you say I, which I are you referring to?" Here we are asking sense-certainty to demonstrate the particularity and immediacy of the being which it would call "I". We are asking it to provide content to the thing that "I" refers to, a specific concrete entity. The word "I" can refer to any entity. Any entity, so long as it has the capacity to speak and refer to itself, can say "I". So again, the "I" that senses, the "I" that sees, or hears, or tastes, or touches, can potentially be anyone. Sense-certainty is not present Now and Here as a singular, completely solitary, sensing. Sense-certainty is present Now and Here along with many others. Sense-certainty has originally taken "I", which refers to itself, to refer to an immediate, particular thing. But it turns out that "I" can refer to anyone; moreover "I" as a word is a universal. Since it is universal, it is mediated. No two I's can merge and experience and sense the same Here and Now as a singular "I". Thus, no two I's are immediately related. The relation between sense-certainty and itself, which refers to itself as "I", is mediated.

A new tension has arisen in this new sub-shape of sense-certainty. This tension has the same character as the tension that arose in the first sub-shape. What sense-certainty imagined to be the case turns out to not be in fact the case at all. Sense-certainty itself was supposed to be the source of its object's immediate particularity. Yet, it has been revealed that sense-certainty itself is itself not an immediate particularity, but a mediated universality. Since sense-certainty is a mediated universality, and this has been discovered using its own terms, then it cannot serve as the ground for the immediate particularity of its object. We have even shown that since sense-certainty is not a singular entity, but plural, it is divided within itself. Sense-certainty, as an activity of knowing, is not at one with itself. Further, its object, as we showed in the first-subshape, is not what it is supposed to be. The object is not at one with itself either. The integrity of this second sub-shape is again threatened, and sense-certainty can no longer maintain it. It is, therefore, compelled to relate to its object in a new way. By doing so, it moves on to a new sub-shape.

Sub-shape 3: "This is Here Now Mine Because It Is One Singular Movement"

Sense-certainty cannot easily give up its object. It has the status of being for it the Absolute truth of things. Yet it cannot resort to saying that the object is an immediate particular sensuous being that is present for sense-certainty, which itself is an immediate particular sensuous being, to sense. Both the object and the activity of knowing, sense-certainty, have been shown to be mediated universals. Sense-certainty cannot say that something is the case when it in fact is not. The ground for the singular immediate particularity of the object cannot be found in sense-certainty, nor can the ground for the singular immediate particularity of sense-certainty be found in the object. Here, sense-certainty makes use of a new tool in its arsenal that has arisen: its experience of the first two sub-shapes. As consciousness continues onward on its path towards absolute knowing, it will pick up new tools along the way. 

This literally just happened.

Now sense-certainty does not depend on the particularity and immediacy of its object to reside in the object itself, or on sense-certainty as an activity of knowing. Neither the object, nor sense-certainty, can justify, or provide a ground, for the particularity and immediacy of the object. Nor does it depend on the particularity and immediacy of sense-certainty as an activity of knowing to reside in sense-certainty itself, or the object. Neither can the object, nor sense-certainty, justify, or provide a ground, for the particularity and immediacy of sense-certainty as an activity of knowing. In other words, it cannot depend on either pole, not on the object or the activity of knowing, to maintain its respective particularity and immediacy without introducing tension individually. It cannot rely on either pole to do this individually. Since it cannot depend on either, it will depend on both. It will combine the first two shapes, and say that since sense-certainty is involved in a singular movement as a whole, both sense-certainty and its object is immediate and particular. What has occurred is a combination of differentiation and identification, an inversion. It takes what is, makes it different from itself, and identifies that difference to itself as difference, and finally relates that difference to the original. This is precisely what happens when one engages in inversion, and this is precisely what sense-certainty has done.

We began with sense-certainty as an inert concept, where there was a knowing that is distinct from its object. Yet, by elaborating on what exactly that kind of relation entails, describing it in its own terms and comparing it to reality, we have discovered that that inert concept has a kind of movement associated with it. We took it to be an inert concept, but thinking it through, it has turned to be a movement - not an inert concept at all. That movement itself is singular, particular, and immediate. It is always happening, sensing and sense. No matter how much we question it, it cannot be prevented from happening. If what is always happening is prevented from happening were to be stopped, there would be no happening at all. There would be no existence whatsoever. Nothing would exist. It appears that sense-certainty has taken all of existence hostage, including us for even we find ourselves to be in error when we first took sense-certainty to be an inert concept, which in fact turned out to be a movement; in this new sub-shape it is confident that it cannot be refuted. 

Now sense-certainty must test out this new position. The singular, immediate, particularity of its movement must be put into practice. This subshape is different in that we cannot merely use words to uncover tensions between what sense-certainty takes its object to be, and what the object is itself. Sense-certainty is nothing other than this movement. It is nothing further and beyond this movement. It can neither apprehend nor grasp anything beyond this movement. In order to test it, sense-certainty experiences its movement and takes notice only of singularity, immediacy, and particularity.

It ignores and takes no account of differentiation, universality or mediation. In terms of "Now", it takes no notice of the fact that every "Now" vanishes. It now asserts "I, this one particular and immediate I, am Here, in this particular and immediate Now." It takes no notice that there are many I's, it has no concern for providing content to justify the truth of its statement because it is itself that very content. No one individual needs to justify his own existence to himself or others, for that existence is independent of that justification. An individual exists whether or not he justifies himself, and provides ground for his own existence as a sensing being. Further, sensing as an activity is actual only for a singular individual. It is not actual for many individuals as a whole. No one individual can sense what the whole group is sensing as a whole. Every individual can only sense what he himself senses. So the fact that "I" refers to any "I" whatsoever doesn't matter. Nor does it matter that the content that "Now" refers to changes always. 

Sense-certainty also asserts, "I, this one particular and immediate I, exist Now, in this particular and immediate Here." It doesn't matter that the content towards which the word "Here" refers is always changing. Regardless of what Here is, I am Here. Further, sense-certainty asserts, "Now is Now and Here is Here, because I am in it." It doesn't matter what either "Now" or "Here" refer to. "Now" is Now and "Here" is Here because sense-certainty is in it. Now and Here are in actual fact what sense-certainty takes it to be. And they can remain so only if sense-certainty, one particular immediate and concrete sense-certainty, holds fast and stands firm within a singular Now and Here. The whole movement has been reduced to an inert state. It seems that that we are back at the beginning and consciousness has shown us what it meant all along when it first responded to our question, "What is This?" Everything is in unity, tranquil and harmonious. Sense-certainty has retained its self-confident certainty.

Now, we must first ask whether the singular Now against which sense-certainty stands firm can actually ever actually exist. We are basically asking, "How big is a moment? Can we measure it?" That singular Now against which sense-certainty stands firm, if it were to be compared how we actually experience every singular now, vanishes just as soon as it comes to be. Time moves independently of the activity of consciousness. Sense-certainty can never stop time itself; yet this is what it has attempted to do, in proclaiming that every Now is singular and immediate, and by implication, inert. Every Now vanishes just as soon as it comes to be. No singular Now abides for any extended period of time. Every Now vanishes immediately. Thus, every Now is just as much, not-Now. We don't have to wait for Night to come to proclaim that it is not-Day. One does not need patience to witness the transition from Now to not-Now. And just as much, as every not-Now is, that not-Now vanish is replaced by a not-not-Now, or rather a new Now, which was different from the first. This goes on to infinity. This is basically how time works. Every Now, even a singular Now, is a complex of Nows that is nested within even more Nows. This complex, if we were to dive into it by taking existence, and making it slower, and slower, and slower, we would never reach a "slowest", a point where Now ceases to vanish. That singular, immediate, particular Now that sense-certainty refers to can never ever exist in reality. It just can't. Time is forever and eternally in motion. It never began, and it will never end. Sense-certainty has shown that it is less concerned with knowing the object, and is more concerned with maintaining itself. It's fanaticism has been revealed. 

Next, we can ask what exactly this singular Here is that sense-certainty refers to, against which it holds and stands firm against. Let's forget that Now is always vanishing and replaced by a new Now that nevertheless remains Now. What, precisely, is This singular and immediate Here? We must remind sense-certainty that no Here is an Absolute Here. Every Here exists in relation to other Heres. This particular Here is an above for another Here, a below for another, a left for another, a right for another, in front of another, and behind another, and everything in between. Further still, for every other Here, there is for it still another to which it is an above, a below, an in front, a behind, a left, a right, etc. This goes on to infinity, for an infinite number of Heres. Sense-certainty does not experience a singular point that it can call "Here", it would be experience zero dimensions, and hence, nothing at all. At the very least it must experience one-dimension, but one dimension, a straight or curved line, has infinitely many distinct points which can be called "Here". Every Here is such in virtue of other Here's; so just like every Now, even a singular Now is a complex, a multiplicity of Nows, every Here, even a singular Here against which sense-certainty stands firm, is a multiplicity of Heres. Space is and always will be extension where every point is distinct from another. 

Finally, every Here is mediated by other Heres, and every Now is mediated by other Nows. Every Here is Here by virtue of being related to other Heres, and every Now is Now by virtue of being related to other Nows. We find that this is true regardless of what the content of Here and Now may be. 

Despite the fact that it has taken its whole movement in its totality to be the source of its immediacy and particularity, and created for itself a supposedly indestructible edifice, we have taken out a pillar that is essential to support that edifice. No matter how we construe it, the object of sense can never be singular, particular in reality. If sense-certainty continues to hold that its object is singular, its imaginings remain that, imaginings. The object has shown itself to be a mediated universal, not an immediate particular as it was originally taken to be. Consciousness, having exhausted every tool in its arsenal that would allow it to preserve the object as an immediate particular, and failing to pick up any new tools along the way, takes its object to now be a mediated universal. 

Consciousness, as an activity of knowing, confronts an object which is essentially mediated and universal. Against this new object, consciousness defines itself as being mediated and universal as well. We will elaborate what this in the next post. By thinking through the object as sense-certainty first construed it, a new object has emerged. In comparing itself to this new object, consciousness is no longer sense-certainty, but Perception.